China is in the news; or more accurately, the Chinese currency, is. From Reuters:
A sharp rise in China’s yuan currency might cut the U.S. trade deficit by as much as one third and create enough American jobs to put at least a modest dent in the unemployment rate.
Then again, it may also lead to a destabilizing spike in Chinese unemployment and spark a trade war that drags the global economy back into a deep recession.
From Reuters, three days ago:
“I still stand by that the science is not settled on man-made global warming,” Perry said while campaigning in the key early primary state of New Hampshire.
By the way of contrast, from the Preface to National Academy of Sciences, Advancing the Science of Climate Change (2010):
…there is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human activities. …
In Lost Decades, Jeffry Frieden and I argue that fiscal consolidation is a necessary prerequisite for long term recovery; however, fiscal consolidation too soon can derail the recovery, and plunge us further into debt. In contrast, some commentators have asserted that fiscal consolidation can be accomplished painlessly, or even with immediate benefits (e.g., JEC-Republicans, Rep. Paul Ryan/Heritage Foundation). Recent empirical work which carefully identifies the relevant episodes concludes that such instances of expansionary fiscal contraction are rare, and usually conducted near full employment. Ball, Leigh and Loungani review the effects of fiscal contraction in “Painful Medicine”.
Last Friday and Saturday, the JIMF 4th Annual Conference at UC Santa Cruz took place, organized by Joshua Aizenman (UCSC & NBER), Robert Dekle (USC) & James Lothian (Fordham University & JIMF) and sponsored by JIMF, SCCIE-UCSC, and the FRBs of Atlanta and San Francisco. I didn’t get a chance to go, which was unfortunate as the papers were relevant to thinking about how the international financial system is linked to the events of 2008.
In our book Lost Decades, Jeffry Frieden and I tried to be as comprehensive as possible in documenting the history we described, the analytical results we reported, and the data we used. We had intended to rely to a greater degree on graphical depictions, but for a variety of reasons, not all the proposed graphs made it in. Hence, we present the graphs that didn’t make it into Lost Decades. (And, by virtue of the just-in-time nature of the web, updated!). The graphs are organized by chapters:
Or at least $805.6 billion as of the end of September, not including debt service and additional reset costs; around $940 billion including interest payments.
As the US economy faces the prospects of stagnant growth or recession, it is of interest to see why the scope for fiscal policy is so circumscribed — that is why is the debt level so high given that in the last year of the Clinton Administration, we were paying down debt? Figure 1 depicts part of the answer (other parts, here).
From Chapter 1 of the IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook (Box 1.2), a set of findings by Jörg Decressin and Marco Terrones:
The econometric results confirm that net capital inflows, financial sector reform, and total factor productivity are good predictors of a credit boom. Net capital inflows appear to have an important predictive edge over the other two factors.
From the preface to Lost Decades, published today (9/19) by W.W. Norton:
The United States … lost the first decade of the
twenty-first century to an ill-conceived boom and a subsequent bust.
It is in danger of losing another decade to an incomplete recovery
and economic stagnation.
In order to not lose the decade to come, the United States will
have to bring order to financial disarray, gain control of a burgeoning
burden of debt, and re-create the conditions for sound economic
growth and social progress. None of this will be easy. The tasks are
made more difficult by the fact, which we have learned to our alarm,
that all too many policymakers and observers cling to the failed
notions that got the country into such trouble in the first place. If
Americans do not learn from this painful episode, and from others
like it, they will condemn the nation to another lost decade.. (p. xvi).
Today, we’re fortunate to have a guest contribution by Jeffry Frieden, Stanfield Professor of International Peace at Harvard University, and coauthor of Lost Decades: The Making of America’s Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery. This article first appeared on Reuter’s Opinion.
Europe’s Lehman Moment
By Jeffry Frieden
Europe is in the midst of its variant of the great debt crisis that hit the United States in 2008. Fears abound that if things go wrong, the continent will face its own “Lehman moment” — a recurrence of the sheer panic that hit American and world markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008. How did Europe arrive at this dire strait? What are its options? What is likely to happen?
Mike Rosenberg (Bloomberg) notes that, when viewing the policy mix from the perspective of fiscal and financial conditions, we are on the following path, even as there is a large amount of slack in the economy [0]: