Some thoughts about the role played by the GSEs in the run-up in mortgage debt and house prices.
Paul Krugman ably lays out the case for why it’s conceivable that Fannie and Freddie could have made a contribution:
Here’s the background: Fannie Mae– the Federal National Mortgage Association– was created in the 1930s to facilitate homeownership by buying mortgages from banks, freeing up cash that could be used to make new loans. Fannie and Freddie Mac, which does pretty much the same thing, now finance most of the home loans being made in America.
The case against Fannie and Freddie begins with their peculiar status: although they’re private companies with stockholders and profits, they’re “government-sponsored enterprises” established by federal law, which means that they receive special privileges.
The most important of these privileges is implicit: it’s the belief of investors that if Fannie and Freddie are threatened with failure, the federal government will come to their rescue.
This implicit guarantee means that profits are privatized but losses are socialized. If Fannie and Freddie do well, their stockholders reap the benefits, but if things go badly, Washington picks up the tab. Heads they win, tails we lose.
Such one-way bets can encourage the taking of bad risks, because the downside is someone else’s problem.
Fannie and Freddie had purchased $4.9 trillion of the mortgages outstanding as of the end of 2007, 70% of which the GSEs had packaged and sold to investors with a guarantee of payment, and the remainder of which Fannie and Freddie kept for their own portfolios. The fraction of outstanding home mortgage debt that was either held or guaranteed by the GSEs (known as their “total book of business”) rose from 6% in 1971 to 51% in 2003. Book of business relative to annual GDP went from 1.6% to 33%.
|
The fact that the volume of mortgages held outright or guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie grew so much faster than either total mortgages or GDP over this period would seem to establish a prima facie case that the enterprises contributed to the phenomenal growth of mortgage debt over this period. Krugman nevertheless concludes that the GSEs aren’t responsible for our current mess:
But here’s the thing: Fannie and Freddie had nothing to do with the explosion of high-risk lending a few years ago, an explosion that dwarfed the S.& L. fiasco. In fact, Fannie and Freddie, after growing rapidly in the 1990s, largely faded from the scene during the height of the housing bubble.
Partly that’s because regulators, responding to accounting scandals at the companies, placed temporary restraints on both Fannie and Freddie that curtailed their lending just as housing prices were really taking off. Also, they didn’t do any subprime lending, because they can’t: the definition of a subprime loan is precisely a loan that doesn’t meet the requirement, imposed by law, that Fannie and Freddie buy only mortgages issued to borrowers who made substantial down payments and carefully documented their income.
These developments appear clearly in the graph above after 2003, which is marked with a vertical line. And certainly much of the dramatic appreciation in house prices came in the two years after the GSEs began to contract.
|
Even more striking is the explosion of home mortgages held in the form of privately-issued asset-backed securities that did not go through either Fannie or Freddie. By 2006, these represented 20% of all outstanding home mortgages.
|
On the other hand, Tanta contributes this:
Fannie and Freddie …. didn’t like losing their market share, and they pushed the envelope on credit quality as far as they could inside the constraints of their charter: they got into “near prime” programs (Fannie’s “Expanded Approval,” Freddie’s “A Minus”) that, at the bottom tier, were hard to distinguish from regular old “subprime” except– again– that they were overwhelmingly fixed-rate “non-toxic” loan structures. They got into “documentation relief” in a big way through their automated underwriting systems, offering “low doc” loans that had a few key differences from the really wretched “stated” and “NINA” crap of the last several years, but occasionally the line between the two was rather thin. Again, though, whatever they bought in the low-doc world was overwhelmingly fixed rate (or at least longer-term hybrid amortizing ARMs), lower-LTV, and, of course, back in the day, of “conforming” loan balance, which kept the worst of the outright fraudulent loans out of the pile. Lots of people lied about their income (with or without collusion by their lender) in order to borrow $500,000 to buy an overpriced house in a bubble market. They weren’t borrowing $500,000 from the GSEs.
Michael Carliner (hat tip: Economist’s View) adds:
Fannie and Freddie are … subject to regulation by HUD under mandates to serve low- and moderate income households and neighborhoods. As originators and investors with more energy than brains expanded their (subprime) lending to those borrowers and neighborhoods, it was difficult for Fannie and Freddie to increase their shares. They didn’t want to buy or guarantee subprime loans, correctly perceiving them to be insanely risky. Instead they purchased securities created by subprime lenders, taking only the supposedly-safe tranches. Those portfolio purchases were counted toward their obligations to lend to lower-income home buyers, but are now part of the write-downs.
For my part, I have two questions for those who take the position that the GSEs played no significant role in causing our current mortgage problems. First, what economic justification is there for the dramatic increase in the share of loans guaranteed or held by the GSEs between 1980 and 2003 that is seen in the first graph presented above? What sense did it make to increase the ratio of such loans to GDP by a factor of 12 over this period?
Second, what forces caused the explosion of private participation in a much more reckless replication of the GSE game? A year ago, I suggested one possible answer– private institutions reasoned that, because the GSEs had developed such a huge stake in real estate prices, and because they were surely too big to fail, the Federal Reserve would be forced to adopt a sufficiently inflationary policy so as to keep the GSEs solvent, which would ensure that the historical assumptions about real estate prices and default rates on which the models used to price these instruments were based would not prove to be too far off.
Is that the answer to the second question? I’m not sure. But if anybody has a better answer, I’d still like to hear it.
In the mean time, I very much agree with Krugman that the most egregious problems were not caused by anything Fannie or Freddie themselves did. But I disagree that their actions played no role in causing the underlying problem we face today.
I think they played their part, but, because of the restrictions on their lending capabilities, I think its hard to pin them as the primary cause of the mortgage meltdown. The lending itself was the prime mover.
Speaking of GSE’s and thier securitizing 70% of subprime loans, does anyone have a number for the total amount of securitized subprime as a percentage of the entire subprime market? How many of these subprime loans were securitized?
Seems that greed, arrogance and lack of regulation are perfectly good answers to question #2.
“Confessions of a Subprime Lender” does a pretty good job of laying out how, as more and more players smelled money and piled in to the subprime party, margins got tighter and tighter and the only way to keep generating income was to increase volume dramatically which meant getting more and more “creative” with the lending. (greed)
Further up the food chain, the investment banks really seem to have believed that their quants had magically squeezed all the risk out no matter how much leverage was applied. (arrogance with a greed cherry on top)
Regulation? Who needs regulation of product Moody’s, Fitch and S&P kept giving AAA ratings to? (since the ratings agencies seem to have been the de facto regulator, lets slap a greed and arrogance tag on them too)
I’m sure somewhere someplace among the many participants there was someone recognized the problem and assuaged their concerns with reasoning similar to your conjecture, but I really doubt that anyone even went so far as to type up a memo saying, “Hey, don’t worry, even if everything goes wrong, the Fed can always inflate our way out this mess, and (insert–investment bank, bank, subprime lender, hedge fund–name here) will survive.
Thanks Jim, we were waiting for someone to take up that Krugman challenge.
One point on why their share of the market increased after the mid-80s: the S&L collapse. This effectively forced US banks to accept that they could not retain the interest rate risk on fixed-rate, long-term mortgages. Really, the only game in town for selling fixed-rate mortgages are the GSEs. Since the GSEs and policy generally pushed fixed-rate mortgages, this meant they had to make up the shortfall (private label fixed-rate issues are pretty small).
Banks can retain adjustable-rate mortgages (indeed, that’s what they do in the Rest of the World), as it removes most of the interest rate mismatch.
The unfortunate link in the media between ARMs and subprime is largely due to this: since subprime (mostly) couldn’t be sold to the GSEs, most subprime were ARM. And since mostly unregulated (compared to GSE), they could be larded up with all sorts of toxic fees and stupid practices (like underwriting on the basis of teaser rates).
There has been a fixation in the US on fixed interest rate mortgages, which was always unrealistic because most of the non-government financial sector works on floating rates for long-term lending and funding.
“Did Fannie and Freddie cause the mortgage crisis?”
Maybe they didn’t cause it but they most certainly played the game to the hilt.
Fannie mae is sitting on over $400 bn of subprime and Alt-A paper [$56 bn subprime and $360 bn Alt-A] of which 32% is in 2 states: Florida and California. Most of that paper was taken in 2005, 2006, 2007, that is at the very top of the bubble.
The Alt-A exposure is over HALF of the total outstanding for Fannie alone.
Forbes 2 months ago:
Fannie’s Chief Executive Daniel Mudd acknowedged that underwriting wasn’t what it should have been during the mortgage market’s heyday, saying that every company has a got part of their book that worries them most, and “In our case, it’s the Alt-A book and we are focused on that.”
Mudd said that the Alt-A vintages performing most poorly in a four-year average book were late ’05, ’06 or early ’07. That is, notably, most of the time.
http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/06/fannie-mae-closer2-markets-equity-cx_md_0506markets50.html
Of course Fannie and Freddie aren’t responsible for the mortgage crisis.
What economists and those that know won’t say is who is because they are intimidated … by the Federal Reserve!
We all know the real culprit, at least 90% of it, was caused by the privately owned and operated Federal Reserve. It was the Federal Reserve that chose not to police or regulate the financial sector so that their owners, the private banks with their investment, insurance and brokerage arms could conjure up exotic instruments that had no economic value but would boost their bottom lines. We also know that the Fed held interest rates too low for too long to give financial institutions a wider spread and help Bush get reelected.
Everybody knows the Federal Reserve is the culprit, EVERYBODY, yet we do this dance around the truth.
This may be kind of a backwards way of answering the first question:
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had to substantially rewrite their books after being caught cooking them in the early 2000s. Since both filled their executive suites with people who had more in the way of political connections than relevant business knowledge and experience, they may have deliberately pursued the subprime path to easy money as a way of getting back what they had to write off. This may well account for the skyrocketing growth that we see beginning in 2003.
But before that, let’s recall that many of the same caliber people, nearly all drawn from the same talent pool, were indeed cooking the books. My best guess is that a large portion of the loans taken on between 1990 and 2003, which corresponds to the largest portion of the growth of loans with respect to GDP, was done largely to conceal the extent of the accounting fraud that ran rampant during this period.
In other words, the primary purpose of taking on these obligations was to pad the books so the people running the GSEs could extract bigger bonuses after generating phony profits.
If something honest was going on instead, I’ll stand happily corrected….
“First, what economic justification is there for the dramatic increase in the share of loans guaranteed or held by the GSEs between 1980 and 2003 that is seen in the first graph presented above?”
I’m not sure that this is a credible argument, but it seems to me that financial innovation has often proceeded this way:
A firm, or small number of firms, figure out
1. a way to price contingent claims on some particular space of states of nature or time
2. a way to match buyers and sellers of those claims on an “industrial scale”, perhaps with some clearing house functions – settlement, and counterparty default protection.
3. a way to cost effectively effect transactions so that trading can be profitable (i.e. low trading costs).
To be sure the GSE’s have a cost of funds advantage because of the implicit guarantee, and some of the growth also may be due to moral hazard problems. However, firms that effectively create new marketplaces both in financial and non-financial products have become very large, very fast, as they grow to meet an unmet hyperelastic demand. EBay comes to mind.
I believe the simple answer to question #2 is that there was a lot of money made in origination and securitization. This was allowed by investors willing to purchase bonds backed by these loans. The rating agencies gave them all they wanted in terms of cover. As long as that bid was there the money machine produced mortgages and bonds. It is interesting to note how many sophisticated investors bought into this – you can now see it not only in hedge fund losses but also in instituional managers who purchased these bonds to beat investment grade indices.
The answer to question 1.
The loan process became specialized and removed from banks.
“Banks no longer loan money, we changed to fee based revenue.” (Source: my banker in 1995).
“CFC has been described as the “23,000% stock” by Fortune magazine. Between 1982 and 2003, Countrywide delivered investors a 23,000% return, exceeding the returns of Washington Mutual, Wal-Mart, and Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.” (Source: Wiki)
Answer to Question #2
The low Fed rate created an opportunity for Wall Street to supply investors with higher yields, culminating in….
“In February 2005, pension funds, banks and hedge funds owned fixed-income securities that were earning returns close to historic lows. AAA-rated securities based on home loans offered yields averaging a full percentage point higher than 10-year Treasuries at the time, according to Merrill.
The trouble was that most creditworthy borrowers had already refinanced their houses at 2003’s record-low mortgage rates. To meet demand for mortgage-backed securities, Wall Street had to find a new source of loans. Those still available mainly involved subprime borrowers, who paid higher rates because they were seen as credit risks.” (Bloomberg Special Report By Mark Pittman)
By making capital available to the housing sector, they surely contributed to the boom, as you note. That is, the correct analysis would be to measure the boom with and without the GSEs. But it should also be noted that substantial capital to the economy was contributed by foreign lenders, and in no small part by official lenders (central banks). Without the GSEs and the official lending, the capital available would have been much smaller, and the boom correspondingly truncated.
If you take the view, as I do, that price is the fundamental issue in this bubble, then a lot of these questions just don’t matter. The question is: who looks at house prices compared to incomes or to rents or to last year’s prices and says: this is getting out of whack?
And the next question is: will somebody now do that, or is the lesson due to be repeated?
This is really an appraisal question at root, not a question of who financed whom.
Re PK’s recent answer – would the S&L’s been that much more prominent absent the GSE’s? E.g., would capital from central bank currency interventions have found its way so easily to the U.S. housing market without the GSE’s?
To your two questions add three more facts that show FF aiding and abetting.
FF went along with the FHA to 3% down payment in 1998. They will take that as long as covered by mortgage “insurance” from folks like PMI and MGIC, or fiddling to borrow more than 80% from home equity.
they grossly overpriced the paper, by only charging about 150bp over TREASURIES, not much more than med term LIBOR . email me for my 16 reasons why mortgage paper is bad paper. Sold at “retail,” holders will NEVER EVER sell even the good stuff at more than say 95% of amortized book value
They grossly underpriced their “insurance” and put no reserves aside with the premiums, est 7bio last year, which they are now massively upping.
It’s great that you picked up on that precise question, James. There is a tension in what Tanta says and what she says she’s saying. The nub of whether this is a problem or a crisis comes down to the meaning of “big” in the low-documentation loans, which they were doing, she says, in a big way.
I have worked in the mortgage industry for many years and have personally witnessed the contributions that Fannie and Freddie have made to the current mortgage crisis. Their automated underwriting systems (AUSs) have encouraged lenders to throw common sense out the window. Lenders feed info into the AUSs and as long as the loan receives a robotic stamp of approval, it gets pushed through, often without requiring sufficient documentation to substantiate the info that was used to arrive at the automated decision. That is simply asking for trouble!
1 Seems clear enough. After lenders were burned borrowing short and lending long in the 70s, and compounded by the S&L crisis in the 80s, this was a business no one wanted. Their model allowed them to do it with relatively low risk and profitably. Their large size and implicit backing encouraged their growth.
2 Private lending created a product with subprime that appeared to produce higher returns while still appearing safe, and best of all they didn’t have to compete with the agencies. Buyers gobbled it up and kept asking for more. Wall Street thrives by selling people what they want. To keep up the supply, they lowered standards, used no doc, teasers, prepayment penalties, and higher commissions, to create increasing amounts of it, all rated triple A. Wall Street is about short term returns. As long as it did well enough to move off their books they had no qualms. The less they knew the better. It is only the sucker that gets stuck with it.
Re: PK’s recent answer once again. I am ignorant of the facts, but I would not be surprised to hear that the S&L’s were subject to much tighter regulatory controls after their earlier crisis. In that case, maybe their later waning infuence was an end-run on such regulation. In any event, I would be surprised if they would have grown that much in a world without the GSE’s.
Arnold Kling, who used to work at Freddie Mac, has his overall take on the picture here, and has several tougher comments on his blog.
He thinks the GSEs are a whole lot more culpable than Krugman does, and rather more culpable than Tanta does.
No, the S&Ls no longer exist. The few remaining became banks. Borrow short to lend long was not a sustainable model, whereas the GSEs borrow long to lend long was. The investment banks are much less regulated than the GSEs, but copied their model with laxer lending to increase fees and rates they could charge.
I don’t buy the applicability of models idea because what they were doing was so far outside the models. Things like no doc, no down, and option arms. They literally didn’t care whether the borrower could afford it; the property was the security. The only thing is putting vast sums in the hands of those who can’t afford it just inflates values, so it required not just inflation but ever increasing inflation to satisfy their model.
Discussions of Fannie and Freddie almost always turn to moral hazard, unqualified loan applicants, and greed or fraud, but what is always ignored is that their structure and purpose are a formula for failure.
Fannie was created in 1938 as one of the ignorant Ponzi scheme plans of the New Deal. The purpose was to provide a means of increasing mortgages for home ownership, but consider what that means. Banks and other institutions limited their long-term investment because they knew that it would tie up their money and prevent future loans. Now there is nothing wrong with this if the investors have this as their purpose, but the creation of Fannie was to allow all financial institutions to create these loans and then sell them to Fannie. Banks no longer had the burden of holding the long-term investment, so they created more loans. Government policy distorted the balance of investment by creating an illusion of increasing resources available for loans, but it was just that, an illusion. There was no value added so to accomplish this, money had to be taken from those very consumers who needed the loans and so they had lower incomes and were a greater loan risk than before. But because more loan money was now available loan interest rates were lower than the market would have set them and requirements for loans were lowered. Loans ballooned just as was intended.
But if you think it through you will realize that there is a limit to how long this Ponzi scheme can grow until it bumps up against its own limits. Once it is limited the political pressure to expand begins again. Fannie like all Ponzi schemes is voracious. Its hunger can never be satisfied.
Today Fannie holds most of the long-term paper of the country, but Fannies hunger for expansion has not been quenched. Fannie needs more and more loans to continue. If Fannies expansion stops then the illusion stops, but even worse if Fannie is reformed to function within the bounds of market demand there will be a huge decline in the loan market with loss of funds and falling real estate prices.
Sadly, there is no other solution and the longer the correction is delayed the worse will be the correction and the more damaging it will be to our economy. We are still paying for the failures and foolishness of the Roosevelt administration and we will continue paying for most of the foreseeable future, but worse today most economic central planners follow the same failed policies and continue to make the problems worse by adding layers of error on top of error.
Point of Information: Fannie and Freddie
A question occurred to me, prompted by this excellent post from James Hamilton on the relationship between the GSE’s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the mortgage crisis. Why is market share important to Fanne Mae or Freddie Mac?
…
Hardly. They carry only a small portion of the paper they take. Most are repackaged for bond sales. They bring together mortgage borrowers, lenders, and bondholders and produce a fairly standardized product. That is real value added, even without the guarantee. They are needed to take on more paper because no one else is willing to do so and without them lending will cease, but this is high risk in a declining market so most likely it will have to cease. But that doesn’t mean there is anything ponzi about it.
Lord wrote:
They are needed to take on more paper because no one else is willing to do so and without them lending will cease, but this is high risk in a declining market so most likely it will have to cease.
Thanks Lord, that is exactly my point. By its very nature Fannie distorts the market by increasing the number of loans. It makes no difference whether these loans are sound or not they are beyond the demand of an open and free market. That investment must be taken from some other market demand. But you have to consider that Fannie and Freddie do not compete at all in the market. They do not pay taxes and they have the power, as you note, guarantee their loans. Look at the professor’s stats again. Fannie and Freddie had purchased $4.9 trillion of the mortgages outstanding as of the end of 2007, 70% of which the GSEs had packaged and sold to investors with a guarantee of payment, and the remainder of which Fannie and Freddie kept for their own portfolios. That ain’t chump change.
I think Paul Gigot’s July 23rd column provides a nice contribution to this discussion:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121677050160675397.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries
A look into Barack Obama and his past might shed some light on the crisis.
Barack Obama joined Trinity United Church of Christ more than 20 years ago and considered the church pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright as his mentor. Rev. Wright married Obama and his wife Michelle, baptized their two daughters and is credited by Obama for the title of his book, “The Audacity of Hope.” In his sermons, Rev. Wright repeated denunciations of the U.S and blurted out statements like The government gives them the drugs, builds bigger prisons, passes a three-strike law and then wants us to sing God Bless America. No, no, no, God damn America, that’s in the Bible for killing innocent people,” he said in a 2003 sermon. “God damn America for treating our citizens as less than human. God damn America for as long as she acts like she is God and she is supreme.”
Looking at Obamas ties to Rev. Wright, and his connections to a terrorist bomber, William Ayers, both men who would like nothing more than to destroy this country causes many people to second guess Obamas intentions for change. If you have not heard about William Ayers, you can read about him in the U.S. News, Michael Barones column-Obama Needs to Explain His Ties to William Ayers. In my U.S. News column, I make a brief reference to the unrepentant Weather Underground terrorist bomber William Ayers and his connections to Barack Obama. They were closer than Obama implied when George Stephanopoulos asked him about Ayers in the April 16 debatethe last debate Obama allowed during the primary season. To get an idea of how close they were, check out Tom Maguire’s Just One Minute blog and Steve Diamond’s Global Labor and Politics. The Obama-Ayers relationship is also mentioned in David Freddoso’s The Case Against Barack Obama: The Unlikely Rise and Unexamined Agenda of the Media’s Favorite Candidate.
Lets examine Obamas connection with an accused political fixer Antoin Tony Rezko. The following is on explanation by Brian Ross and Rhonda Schwartz from ABC News. In sharp contrast to his tough talk about ethics reform in government, Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., approached a well-known Illinois political fixer under active federal investigation, Antoin “Tony” Rezko, for “advice” as he sought to find a way to buy a house shortly after being elected to the United States Senate. Rezko had been widely reported to be under investigation by the U.S. attorney and the FBI at the time Obama contacted him and has since been indicted on corruption charges by a federal grand jury in a case that prosecutors say involves bribes, kickbacks and “efforts to illegally obtain millions of dollars.”
Because Barack Obama was a dependable ally of subsidized developers in the Legislature, his friend and fund-raiser Rezko depended on him to get things done such as cosponsoring a bill in 2001 allowing developers to pocket half of the proceeds from selling state tax credits to others. Obama admitted that his decision to involve Rezko was a bone-headed mistake. What he failed to mention is that he has a closet full of bone-headed mistakes such as Peter Wallsten pointed out in the Los Angeles Times on
January 24, 2008.
Barack Obama angered fellow Democrats in the Illinois Senate when he voted to strip millions of dollars from a child welfare office on Chicago’s West Side. But Obama had a ready explanation: He goofed.
“I was not aware that I had voted no,” he said that day in June 2002, asking that the record be changed to reflect that he intended to vote yes.
That was not the only misfire for the former civil rights attorney first elected to the state Senate in 1996. During his eight years in state office, Obama cast more than 4,000 votes. Of those, according to transcripts of the proceedings in Springfield, he hit the wrong button at least six times.
Now comes the big question, what exactly does a community organizer do?
One thing Barack Obama did as a community organizer was pressure banks to make bad loans. In Barack Obamas youthful community organizing days he joined a group called ACORN. Using the Community Reinvestment Act which was designed to encourage banks to make loans to high-risk borrowers, ACORN started abusing the law by forcing banks to make hundreds of millions of dollars in ‘subprime’ loans to minorities with bad or no credit. Using charges of racism and threats to use CRA to block business expansions have enabled ACORN to extract hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and contributions from Americas financial institutions.
Other things that ACORN did as community organizers were agitate for higher minimum wages, attempt to thwart school reform, try to unionize welfare recipients who are obliged to work in exchange for benefits and organize voter registration drives. In 2006 for example, their voter registration drive in Washington produced 1,800 new voters of which 1,794 names submitted were fake. The secretary of state called it the worst case of election fraud in our states history.
If you like to know more, watch these two videos.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRmB93McZeI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MGT_cSi7Rs
Cybercorrespondent
http://cybercorrespondent.blogspot.com
Thursday morning I turned on the news and heard that ACORN is under investigation for voter fraud in a number of states. Since I learned not to trust what the media tells us, I decided to have a look what the bloggers had to say. On a sight called A Look Into Barack Obamas Past – Obamamania – Zimbio website I found the following comment that made me think.
A concerned citizen
Oct-6-08 7:48pm [Edit]
Those two videos paint a very clear picture. As the terrorists have promised, they will destroy this country from with in. ..
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=puN9X1mVgRA ..
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjvBEKrGkDI .
Back to my point. By allowing the voter fraud to go on, makes this great country look like a third world dictatorship. We are supposed to send an example to the rest of the world how honest elections are held and not allow the media to distort the facts. Please people, wake up and tell the media no more. Boycott all the products advertised on publications like the Newsweek, Time magazine and other propaganda machines like the New York Times. Also do the same with CNN and other communist propaganda news sources. Even the Fox News network is starting to sway the viewer decision. After Thursdays presidential debate, watching Chris Wallace interview a communist from Saint Louis made me sick. Even bad journalists should realize that when you ask a communist or a skin head to give you their views, you can pretty much expect what they are going to say.
I certainly had enough of all of the $%#@Comunism.org
Cybercorrespondent