A month ago, I examined the information content of the OECD’s Composite Leading Indicators. The August release (for June data) is out. There’s substantial variation in the implied outlook across economies.
Author Archives: Menzie Chinn
GDP, Potential, and Debt Forecasts — and Implied Multipliers
GDP Forecasts
The WSJ August survey indicates a resumption of growth in Q3. What was perhaps a bit surprising was the bump up in the Q3 q/q SAAR growth from about 1 percent to 2.4 percent. The out-quarters were little changed. These forecasts imply the following trajectory for GDP.
The Paranoic Impulse in Current Discourse
Or, “return of the black helicopters”
Plenty of examples of hyperbole in current policy discussions, but here I want to return [0] to the specific topic of whether several key data series examined by economic analysts can be trusted, or whether in fact they are deliberately manipulated by government bureaucrats. Case in point is Econbrowser reader DickF‘s comments:
The government thinks it can run the economy on data that is years old and inaccurate at best. Also any time numbers are manipulated by government there is a political element involved. The whole reason the numbers are manipulated is to the will be “more normal” but who decides what is normal? In the government political bureaucrats who know their jobs depend on pleasing the politically connected. This is just another reason why centrally planned economies always fail. The hubris in government economic circles is enormous.
…
I am not saying that the agencies are manipulating data to make “each respective Administration look good.” Sometimes they manipulate date to make an Administration look worse than it actually is. It depends on their political inclination.
Exchange Rates: New Papers
During the summer, I had the good fortune to attend two excellent conferences focused on new findings in exchange rate economics (yes, not all economic research is focused on the financial crisis and recession). The first was a Bank of Canada-European Central Bank conference Exchange rates: The global perspective, and the second was the NBER International Finance and Macroeconomics Summer Institute session “Exchange Rates and Relative Prices”.
Employment, Hours, and Estimated Output
Some observations on the employment situation and other economic indicators: (1) Not only is nonfarm payroll employment slowing its rate of descent, so is private employment; (2) but perhaps more dramatically the decline of aggregate hours halted last month; (3) the rate of decrease has diminished even faster for civilian employment measured by the household survey, and indeed; (4) the household (research) series adjusted to conform to the payroll series is now improving; and (5) a first “estimate” of July GDP supports the case for stabilization of output.
China’s Impact on the Global Economy: A Symposium
As attested to by the large amount of coverage of the recent US-China Strategic and Economic Dialog [0] [1], [2], [3], [4],[5] China looms large in any discussion of the world economy. One of the most important contributors to the informed discussion on this subject was Brad Setser, at the Council on Foreign Affairs and before that at RGE Monitor. Unfortunately, Dr. Setser will be leaving the blogosphere, so his insights will be missed (although fortunately for us, he’ll be adding his input at the NEC, where we all wish him well).
So now, there’ll be even a greater need for reasoned analysis. One addition to the discussion is a Symposium on China’s impact on the global economy just published in Pacific Economic Review (August 2009). From my introductory chapter to the symposium:
Over the past decade, China’s presence in the global economy has grown
increasingly large. Along many dimensions, China is, rightly or wrongly,
perceived to have an enormous impact. In the trade arena, China is now widely
considered to be the world’s workshop, displacing some traditional exporters
of labour-intensive goods, even as its economy is ever more closely woven into
the fabric of the increasingly fragmented chain of production….
Comparing the Current Recession and the “1980-82 Recession”
At least one observer has argued that the current recession is not as bad as that of the 1980-82 recession, when those two separate recessions (1980Q1-1980Q3; 1981Q3-1982Q4) are considered as one (see [1] [2]). Here is my interpretation of this assertion, updated to use the latest GDP data, and normalizing (log) GDP on the recession start dates.
Multipliers, under Differing Monetary Regimes
Here’s another installment in a series attempting to move the discussion from “my estimate vs. your estimate” (or “prior”, as the case may be) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] to something more constructive (and hopefully more nuanced). From the conclusion to “Expectations and Fiscal Stimulus” by Troy Davig and Eric M. Leeper:
This paper has embedded estimated Markov-switching rules for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy into an otherwise conventional calibrated DSGE model with nominal rigidities to deliver some quantitative predictions of the impacts of government
spending increases. When monetary and fiscal policy regimes vary — from active monetary/passive fiscal to passive monetary/active fiscal to doubly passive to doubly active — government spending multipliers can vary widely. An increase in government spending of $1 in present value raises output by $0.80 in present value under
[Active Money/Passive Fiscal] AM/PF, while it raises output by as much as $1.80 in present value when monetary policy is passive. In our simple model, this translates into a decrease in consumption of $0.20 in present value under AM/PF, but an increase in consumption of about $0.80 in present value under passive monetary policy.
Good News and Bad News from the GDP release
Some additional observations (see Jim Hamilton’s take, as well as others) on the GDP release: (1) the five year revision indicates that GDP was larger than we thought, but it also declined faster in 2009Q1; (2) GDP growth was lower throughout 2008 than earlier estimated; (3) GDP growth in 2008Q2 at 1.5% SAAR would have likely been at zero or negative in the absence of the January 2008 stimulus package in which case; (4) GDP q/q growth would have been negative from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2; (5) the case that ARRA directly affected 2009Q2 GDP is limited, in a mechanical sense since most of the increase in government spending is accounted for by defense spending; and (6) the US ex-oil ex-agricultural net exports to GDP ratio is back to where it was in 1998Q1.
Fiscal Policy and Banking Sector Repair Synergies
From the conclusion to “How Effective is Fiscal Policy Response in Systemic Banking Crises?”, by E. Baldacci, S. Gupta, and C. Mulas-Granados:
This paper assessed the effects of fiscal policy responses during 118 episodes of systemic
banking crises in advanced and emerging market economies. The results indicate that timely
countercyclical fiscal responses (both due to discretionary measures and automatic
stabilizers), accompanied by actions to deal with financial sector weaknesses, contribute to
shortening the length of crisis episodes. During crisis caused by financial sector distress,
fiscal expansions increase the likelihood of earlier exit from a shock episode. Expansionary
fiscal policies reduced the crisis duration by almost one year. These results hold for different
definitions of crisis duration and alternative specification and estimation methods. The
findings are consistent with recent studies that highlight the importance of countercyclical
policy in response to recessions associated with financial sector problems (Classens, Kose,
and Terrones, 2008; IMF, 2009b; IMF, 2009c).