Category Archives: Trade Policy

Thoughts on Trade, Growth and Inequality from “Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy”

The Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole symposium this year focused on the causes, implications and remedies for the slowdown in economic growth. Major themes revolved around productivity, fiscal policy, and international trade. Here I discuss some of the major points relating to international trade and inequality, encompassing a paper by Nina Pavcnik (Dartmouth), comments by David Dorn (Zurich), and panel remarks by Ann Harrison (UPenn), Catherine Mann (OECD), Peter Schott (Yale), and John Van Reenen (MIT).

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How Will the Wall Be Funded?

Donald Trump has reaffirmed: “One way or the other Mexico will pay for the wall.” At the same time, as recently as today, Trump threatened a government shutdown if Congress did not provide funding for the wall. Time to consider how these points are — or are not — internally consistent, even allowing for the possibility that Mexico might “ultimately” pay.

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Non-Credible Threats Are Only Non-Credible when Actors Are Sane

Ordinarily, when I read a senior government official stating:

“We have other methods of addressing those who threaten us, and of addressing those who supply the threats. We have great capabilities in the area of trade.”

[US Ambassador to UN Nikki] Haley said she spoke at length to President Donald Trump on Wednesday morning about “countries that are allowing, even encouraging trade with North Korea, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.”

“Such countries would also like to continue their trade arrangements with the United States,” she said. “That’s not going to happen. Our attitude on trade changes when countries do not take international security threats seriously.”

I discount such talk as constituting a non-credible threat. That’s because punishing China with effective trade sanctions would likely hurt America as much as the target (including through third channels as the global economy is hurt).

But the threat is truly non-credible if the agents are rational, as in the Rational Agent model of international relations (see alternatives, here). But using that model as a baseline is probably not correct for the Trump Administration. I think a better framework for analysis (if not a model) would be stumbling into conflict with a misapprehension of costs, benefits, and the workings of the world, as in this case.

Of course, that does not mean that China would accede to US demands even if we imposed sanctions.