With an application to accurately counting stimulus effects, for the benefit of the numerically challenged
Here I try to explain why dividing a number at a point in time by a cumulative number does not make sense (Warning: some understanding of calculus helpful). Reader Manfred defends the Weekly Standard’s calculation of dividing net jobs created at an instant in time by cumulative spending to obtain a dollars/job figure. Specifically:
Or, on reading those who can do math, and those who can’t (i.e., yet more from Heritage)
I thought it useful to take a look at a few retrospective macro indicators pertaining the December 2010, three years after the beginning of what some term “the Great Recession”. In particular, recall that some observers were, even ten months into the recession, and a month after Lehman’s collapse, denying the possibility of a truly deep loss in employment, and the idea of a lack of credit availability.
Professor Casey Mulligan has an interesting post, in which he observes that while retail sales are about 15-20% higher in December than in the previous three months, retail employment is only about 4% higher in December than October, thus proving that fiscal stimulus cannot be very effective.
Most forecasts incorporate a resurgence in the US trade and current account deficits. This projection makes sense to the extent that the US is expected to grow faster than Europe and Japan, and the estimated income elasticity of US imports exceeds that of US exports (the Houthakker-Magee finding [0]). Here’s a summary of forecasts for the current account.
Professor Mulligan asserts that the payroll tax cut will have little effect on output, even in sticky price Keynesian, and New Keynesian, models. He writes:
The 2010Q2 advance GDP release has been covered by Jim, as well as others. [RTE/Izzo] [CEA] [FreeExchange/RA] [CR] [MA] The release was accompanied by an annual revision of data extending back to data for 2007Q1. This revision alters our understanding (or lack of understanding in the cases of certain people) of the evolution of this recession. Here are the points I gleaned.
Back in November 2009, Casey Mulligan asked this question, and observed:
Both of these [disposable income and consumption] are HIGHER in September 2009 than they were a year earlier.
I observed that it made sense to look at per capita values; and that changed the conclusions substantially.
Some analysts (e.g., most recently Professor Mulligan) have stressed the disincentive effects of unemployment insurance on the unemployment rate and the level of employment. I think it useful to consider the offsetting effects arising from various effects, and hence distinguishing between the two variables. In my view, the impact of UI is more complicated than it would seem at first glance, with UI potentially increasing employment while concurrently increasing the unemployment rate. In addition, according to newer research, even if UI extends unemployment duration, it still might be welfare-enhancing. In other words, some researchers appear to have had their worldview frozen in 1990.
Or, counterfactuals, yet again.
Or, rejoinder to Casey Mulligan, Joseph Lawler, david, tim kemper and others.
From the WSJ March survey survey of forecasters, the results indicate that instead of the 0.15% growth rate recorded in 09Q4 y/y growth, the growth rate would have been -0.93%. For 2010Q4 Q4/Q4 growth, they forecast 3% growth, and in the absence of the ARRA, they would have predicted 2.2% growth.