With some implications for the debate over assessing fiscal and monetary policies
Reader Brian writes:
DSGE’s aren’t the answer to everything, but I still find the microfoundations, careful treatment of expectations, etc. still attractive and, in my opinion, the best we have at the moment.
With an application to accurately counting stimulus effects, for the benefit of the numerically challenged
Here I try to explain why dividing a number at a point in time by a cumulative number does not make sense (Warning: some understanding of calculus helpful). Reader Manfred defends the Weekly Standard’s calculation of dividing net jobs created at an instant in time by cumulative spending to obtain a dollars/job figure. Specifically:
Or, on reading those who can do math, and those who can’t (i.e., yet more from Heritage)
Here’s how I’m hoping this might work out.
Reuters reported yesterday that the preliminary July reading for the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan’s index of consumer
sentiment fell to 63.8, the lowest level in more than two years. In fact, that’s about as low as this measure ever got in the recessions of 1981-82 or 1990-91, and is well below values for the recession of 2001.
Or lack thereof
Reports indicate that one of the reasons the “grand bargain” failed was the refusal of one party to accede to an increase in tax rates on households with AGI above $250,000. [1]. I can understand this reluctance, given that the share of total income going to the top 5% of households fell from 38.7% to 36.5%, going from 2007 to 2008 (just ignore the increase of 17.6 percentage points in the previous 30 years). Below is an updated graph from our forthcoming book Lost Decades by myself and Jeffry Frieden, illustrating the grievous harm that these households have endured.
Event studies are one method that has been used to try to assess the potential effects on markets of nonstandard monetary policy measures such as QE2. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis recently hosted a conference whose objective was to evaluate evidence on the effects of these policies. Here I relate remarks I made at the conference on some of the challenges from trying to use event studies to answer this question.
At the NBER meetings, I have been asking around what will happen if the Federal government defaults, and Treasurys go down a notch in ratings. Keep in mind pension funds and financial institutions are constrained to hold at least some AAA rated securities. What happens if those securities are downgraded; should we expect a smooth, re-balancing of portfolios worldwide?
Jeff Frankel dissects why we are in this situation, using fable (well, a movie fable):
Today’s two sessions — one in the NBER’s International Finance and Macro group and one in Monetary Economics — included papers that tackled multipliers from a variety of directions. The general results indicated to me that, while multipliers are sometimes below unity, for conditions prevailing in the United States in 2011, they are typically above.
As Congress and the President continue to wrangle over raising the debt ceiling, more of us are wondering, what would happen if the debt ceiling isn’t raised? To paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be Plan A.