From the Peterson Institute comes the “Real Time Economics Watch”. The latest posts are on how each crisis is different and yet the same [0], by Ted Truman, and the US/Japan parallels (or lack thereof) [1], authored by Adam Posen.
(The Peterson Institute doesn’t call it a weblog, but it seems like one…)
From the Justin Fox, regarding House Republicans’ plan:
…that of the House Republican Study Committee, seems to be a joke. It calls for a two-year suspension of the capital gains tax to “encourag[e] corporations to sell unwanted assets.” But the toxic mortgage securities clogging up bank balance sheets are worth less now than when they were acquired. Meaning that no capital gains tax would be owed on them anyway. If you repealed the tax, banks would have even less incentive to sell them because they wouldn’t be able use the losses to offset capital gains elsewhere. Seriously, where do these people come up with this stuff?
Eric Cantor, the Republican chief deputy whip, has a more reasonable-sounding if still pretty vague plan to insure more mortgages rather than buy mortgage securities. ….
I’m in agreement with Justin that guaranteeing even more mortgages won’t be any better than the original Paulson plan.
My observation here is that the obstructionism of this group is either a manifestion of denial of reality, or a sheer indifference to the needs of their constituents — to the extent that House Republicans purport to represent small business Main Street.
Most of the discussion surrounding the current crisis has focused on the implications for major businesses and their hiring and investment decisions, or households and their employment possibilities, or consumer behavior. One overlooked (or underemphasized) aspect of the issue is the impact on small firms. Fortunately, my former colleague (and coauthor), Rob Fairlie has just published a book that can inform one’s thinking on this subject.
As the Congress was debating how much power and how many hundreds of billions to the US Treasury, I was pondering who would be in charge of all that come January 20th.
Here’s how it was reported, for example, in the Wall Street Journal:
Reaction to the Wall Street bailout and frenzied last-minute trading in the oil market sent crude prices soaring by more than $16 a barrel, the biggest one-day jump ever.
The late-day spike, which shoved oil up 16% to $120.92 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange, offered an illustration of Wall Street’s hard-to-predict moves amid broad market turmoil.
And here’s what really happened.
I’ll just take the market’s view here; using the futures prices from the CME (via ino.com), prices will fall about another 16% from June (or 17% in log terms):
This morning, I had the pleasure of discussing this issue with GMU’s Russell Robert on Minnesota Public Radio’s Midmorning show. The link is here.
Brad DeLong had some insightful and amusing observations on the priorities of Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. I can’t resist reproducing Brad’s comments with some annotations of my own.
Let me begin with the point on which I am in complete agreement with Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke– it is hard to overstate just how scary this week’s developments in financial markets could be.
From a timely BIS working paper by Lucy Ellis released on Thursday:
Mortgage lending standards eased in many countries in recent years, but the limited available cross-country evidence does suggest that the process went further in the United States. Standards are difficult to measure because different aspects need not all move together (Gorton 2008), but the observed increase in early payment defaults in the United States (but not elsewhere) provides direct evidence that it occurred (Kiff and Mills 2007); Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund and Willen (2008) provide additional detail on the easing in lending standards.
Two developments seem to have spurred the easing in US standards. First, a range of legislative and policy changes had been made to encourage the development of a non-conforming (Alt-A and subprime) lending sector, lying outside the model defined by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Part of the motivation for this was a desire to ensure that home ownership was accessible to households who had historically been underserved by mortgage lenders (Gramlich 2007). In addition, the administration had wanted to reduce the GSEs’ domination of the mortgage market. Following problems with accounting and governance at both institutions, the GSEs’ capacity to expand lending was capped by new regulatory limits on their activities (Kiff and Mills 2007, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2008). [emphasis added — mdc]