I’ve just come back from two weeks on the road, during which time I attended a couple of conferences. The first conference (NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics) dealt with issues of exchange rates, reserve accumulation and financial crises (more on that later). The second one, a joint Bank of Canada-ECB workshop (not online), focused on exchange rates in the global economy. At the latter, Jeff Frankel delivered the keynote speech, entitled “On Global Currency Issues”, in which he outlined what’s “out” and what’s “in” in international finance (Powerpoint presentation here). One of the phenomena he concluded was no longer relevant was “the global saving glut”.
Author Archives: Menzie Chinn
Guest Blog: The Impact of the Trilemma Configurations on Macroeconomic Performance
By Hiro Ito
Today, we’re fortunate to have Hiro Ito, Associate Professor of Economics at Portland State University as a guest blogger.
In my last posting, I introduced a recent paper coauthored with Menzie Chinn and Joshua Aizenman (UC, Santa Cruz) on the “trilemma,” or “impossible trinity” — a country simultaneously may choose any two, but not all, of the three goals, monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration.
The Dollar as a Reserve Currency: Apres le Deluge
Time to review trends in reserves, against the backdrop of financial crisis, recession, and dollar gyrations. (I’ll try to be original, but Brad Setser has been more diligent than I in covering these issues over the past few months. [0] [1] [2])
A few observations:
- Known dollar reserves as a share of world reserves appear to be falling.
- Total dollar reserves have likely not declined as precipitously.
- Even with the decline in the dollar share, it is probably not as low as it was during the early 1990’s.
- The dollar share is (mechanically) linked to the dollar’s value.
- Known dollar reserves at end-2008 are less than predicted by a historical correlation.
- But this differential is infinitesimal compared to the “unallocated” share of total reserves.
How Important Is China to World Growth?
This is a tough question to answer. But I can provide an answer of a mechanical sort. Consider how big the Chinese economy is, compared against the US, the Euro area and Japan.
DeGlobalization: Transitory or Persistent?
It’s not news that the US current account, trade balance and trade balance ex.-oil are all moving toward zero percentage points of GDP. As I’ve observed before, time will tell how much of this movement is durable (see Bertaut, Kamin and Thomas for skeptical look; see also Cline-Williamson); this in turn depends on whether the adjustment reflects standard macro effects, including a permanent downshift in US consumption growth [0], and how much reflects perhaps transitory effects like a credit crunch in trade financing (as speculated upon here). Here’s the trade balance situation for the US.
James Pethokoukis: “An improving job market”
Hmm. I’m not sure about this statement.
Relevant and Irrelevant Criticisms of the Stimulus Package
Keith Hennessey critiques the stimulus package. Some points make sense, some points, well, I wonder. For instance, Hennessey argues the stimulus is not timely. As I’ve noted before, it’s not timely only if you think this will be a relatively short recession, characterized by a rapidly dissipating negative output gap. [0] [1] [2].
Output, Employment and Industrial Production in the “1980-82 Recession”
In today’s NYT, Casey Mulligan presents an interesting picture of GDP during the “1980-82 recession” — the conjoining of the two NBER defined recessions in 1980 and 1981-82. Based on the comparison with the current recession, he concludes:
While the job losses, foreclosures, stock declines and other casualties of the current recession have been very painful, substantially more bad economic news is needed to make this recession worse than the downturns of 1980-’82, at least in G.D.P. terms.
High Anxiety (about Interest and Inflation Rates)
In March 2001, I was tasked to follow developments in Japanese macro policy (including monetary, exchange rate, and banking recapitalization issues). Readers will be tempted to ask what this has to do with current events. Well, at the time, Japan was facing rapidly rising net debt-to-GDP ratios (rising from 60.4 ppts of GDP to 84.6 ppts from 2000 to 2005), and was embarking upon a policy of quantitative easing in an attempt to stave off a deep recession. And yet opponents of quantitative easing worried about hyper-inflation, even as y/y inflation at the time remained mired in the negative range. I didn’t understand the fears at the time; and I still don’t. Now flash forward eight years, and move across the Pacific.
Guest Blog: Japan’s first trade deficit in 28 years
By Eiji Fujii
Today, we’re fortunate to have Eiji Fujii, Professor of Economics at Tsukuba University as a guest blogger.
Shaken by the world financial crisis, Japan has recorded the first trade deficit (on the April-March fiscal year basis) in 28 years (see Figure 1). The trade balance of the 2008 Japanese fiscal year was about -725 billion yen. The last trade deficit (on the fiscal year basis) was recorded in 1980 when the second oil crisis hit the economy hard.