With the cover page of the Economist [1] [2] worrying about currency wars, and various analysts arguing whether the US can or cannot win such a “war” (see Naked Capitalism for a discussion), I thought it would be useful to see where we now stand, in terms of “competitiveness”, as understood by open economy macroeconomists.
Having earlier reviewed some of the reasons in favor of additional quantitative easing (QE2), I’d like to acknowledge some of the dissenting views.
One theme that emerged from the monetary policy conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on Friday and Saturday is that, as I stressed in my discussion of the recent FOMC minutes, the Fed is not thinking of large-scale asset purchases as the only tool available in the current environment.
I’m in Boston today at a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke spoke this morning and this afternoon I presented results from my research with Cynthia Wu. I hope to have time later this weekend to say a little more about some of the presentations and discussion. But for now let me provide a link to an interview with CNBC on some of these issues.
I’ve been lecturing on the government sector in my macro course. In updating my lecture notes, I plotted out some interesting graphs, which link up nicely with this previous post. The following four figures highlight: (1) normalized Federal outlays are not much higher than in 1986; (2) government consumption to GDP is back up to 1991 levels; (3) the cyclically adjusted budget deficit is only 2 ppts larger than that recorded in 1987; and (4) Federal consumption remains far below the previous peak in 2007.
Most observers now seem convinced that the Federal Reserve will shortly implement QE2, a second round of quantitative easing. It’s worth taking a look at what QE2 is and is not expected to accomplish.
That was the title of a seminar at the annual IMF-World Bank meetings I participated in last Thursday (agenda here).
Over the last month, a consensus seems to have emerged that (1) the Fed has the ability to depress long-term yields further, and (2) the Fed has the intention to implement such measures. That raises the possibility that recent market moves represent a bet already placed by market participants on the basis of the logical implications of (1) and (2).
Today, we’re fortunate to have Mark Copelovitch, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin, as a Guest Contributor. He is also author of The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Recent economic indicators tell more of the same story– disappointingly weak growth.