A Continued Russian Invasion of Ukraine – Six Scenarios in Three Maps

From Seth Jones/CSIS (mid-January):

1. Redeploy some of its ground forces away from the Ukrainian border—at least temporarily—if negotiations are successful but continue to aid pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine.

2. Send conventional Russian troops into the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as unilateral “peacekeepers” and refuse to withdraw them until peace talks end successfully and Kiev agrees to implement the Minsk Accords.

3. Seize Ukrainian territory as far west as the Dnepr River to use as a bargaining chip or incorporate this new territory fully into the Russian Federation. This option is represented in Figure 2a.

4. Seize Ukrainian territory up to the Dnepr River and seize an additional belt of land (to include Odessa) that connects Russian territory with the breakaway Transdniestria Republic and separates Ukraine from any access to the Black Sea. The Kremlin would incorporate these new lands into Russia and ensure that the rump Ukrainian statelet remains economically unviable.

5. Seize only a belt of land between Russia and Transdniestria (including Mariupol, Kherson, and Odessa) to secure freshwater supplies for Crimea and block Ukraine’s access to the sea, while avoiding major combat over Kiev and Kharkiv. This option is represented in Figure 2b.

6. Seize all of Ukraine and, with Belarus, announce the formation of a new tripartite Slavic union of Great, Little, and White Russians (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). This option would involve operations represented in Figure 2a as “phase one,” with Figure 2c representing “phase two” of this option.

Here are the relevant maps.

Source: CSIS (1/13/2022).

Source: CSIS (1/13/2022).

 

Source: CSIS (1/13/2022).

This analysis was from January 14th, which predated the increased number of forces in Belarus, and (of course) recent movements of units to battle positions. Here is a schematic (i.e., no real depiction of unit type – mech infantry vs. armor vs. arty) depiction of Russian force disposition. From CNN:

Source: CNN (2/18/2022).

The extent and nature of US and allied response clearly depends on the path taken by the Russians. The impact on the Russian and world economy is thus contingent. Wells Fargo takes a pretty sanguine view:

In our view, global economic growth is not at risk should Russia and Ukraine enter recession as a result of conflict and/or international sanctions. However, oil prices could move higher as a result of Russia supply disruptions, which could weigh on purchasing power and result in energy shortages, particularly within the European Union. Oil prices are a key influence for Russia, and current supply/demand dynamics suggest oil prices could move higher, especially if sanctions are imposed on Russia. Should oil prices remain steady or move higher, we believe the Russian economy and local financial markets will be more protected relative to 2014 even if sanctions are imposed, while the ruble selloff will likely be more contained.

Russian real GDP shrunk in 2014, partly due to sanctions, partly due to oil prices falling. Right now oil prices are rising, and prospects are for continued elevated prices given continued global recovery – and oil (and natural gas)  is pretty much all Russia exports.

Still, it doesn’t take a lot of movement in growth to derail oil prices (given the price inelasticity of demand for oil), so I wouldn’t bet too much on this trend (even if it’s a reasonable base case scenario).

The Russian currency is already under pressure (see this post), the stock market is down nearly 20% since mid-October, y/y inflation in January is 8.73% – on par with what it was on the even of the 2014 invasion. Finally, Q3 q/q growth rate was -0.8% (not annualized). That’s the context to consider what might end up being the “mother of all sanctions“:

In January, the IMF forecast a 4.2% q4/q4 growth rate in 2021, so that implies 1.1% growth in Q4 (if previous quarters are unrevised). (The IMF forecasts are based on data roughly Dec 10, 2021-Jan 7, 2022).

 

65 thoughts on “A Continued Russian Invasion of Ukraine – Six Scenarios in Three Maps

  1. pgl

    Thanks for the coherent discussion ala Seth Jones:

    ‘The Kremlin wants what it says: an end to NATO expansion, a rollback of previous expansion, a removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe, and a Russian sphere of influence. However, Putin may accept less. The Kremlin’s primary goal is a guarantee that Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia will never belong to a military or economic bloc other than the ones Moscow controls and that Russia will be the ultimate arbitrator of the foreign and security policy of all three states. In essence, this conflict is about whether 30 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, its former ethnic republics can live as independent, sovereign states or if they still must acknowledge Moscow as their de facto sovereign.’

    A few of our resident “experts” have suggested Putin’s goals are less demanding. Can we be clear? They have no clue what they are babbling about.

    And thanks for the economic analysis of the impact of what looks like may be a horrific invasion. Of course the price we will pay in terms of higher oil prices is minor in comparison what may be endured by the citizens of Ukraine.

    1. Steven Kopits

      Let me quote myself:

      Washington has demonstrated weakness in foreign policy, notably by allowing the US to be ignominiously chased out of Afghanistan by a ragtag Taliban at a time when the US was neither taking casualties nor incurring extravagant costs. If the Biden administration exhibits such passivity in Ukraine and NATO sits on the sidelines, then Putin can take Ukraine and perhaps even Belarus and restore most of imperial Russia. But should Washington decide to intervene, the calculus is entirely different. Putin must weigh the risks.

      Biden should have been clear upfront: The US would not abide re-writing Europe’s borders in this fashion and would meet the Russians in the field. That might have prevented Putin from investing so much of his and Russia’s prestige into this perilous venture. However, it would not have addressed Russian concerns and, if the US is to veto Russian action, as the global hegemon, America is obligated to find some reasonable accommodation.

      https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/it-possible-putin-get-crimea-without-force

          1. Ivan

            Not only did the Orange Disaster sign a US surrender agreement with Taliban (we will get out by May as long as you don’t shoot at us on the way out) -even worse he set up an office maned by two people to handle the immigration of Afghans who helped us – condemning them to almost certain death. The competent US leader who took over a year ago managed to negotiate an extension of getting out of there (although he had no credible leverage). In spite of the chaos left by Trump he also managed to get out with the loss of only 13 soldiers in just a single terrorist attack – and save about 100,000 Afghan friends. Competence in the White House matters.

          2. Steven Kopits

            Well, Ivan, before Afghanistan, Biden’s net approval was +10. Since Afghanistan, it’s been -10. He’s now at -11.5. In a month, his approval will be lower than Trump’s at the same time in his presidency. I am sure you think Biden is hugely competent. The public disagrees.

            Let me quote myself again:

            Our forecasts of a record 2.1 million apprehensions for fiscal and calendar year 2022 remain unchanged. Barring a material change in border policy, the fiscal year record will be formally determined around October 21st, the date CBP is likely to publish the September apprehensions numbers. The midterm elections are on November 8th, not three weeks later. As I have written before, Democrats should put themselves on suicide watch, and indeed, they are, with the number of House Democrats not seeking reelection this year at a 30-year high, per The Hill. Even more will announce retirements as events in Ukraine prove to be a turbo-charged version of the debacle in Afghanistan, with the likes of CNN contrasting the images of dead Ukrainian children with members of the 82nd Airborne playing video games in Poland. Record apprehensions will not be the Biden administration’s only problem come November.

            https://www.princetonpolicy.com/ppa-blog/2022/2/19/january-southwest-border-apprehensions

          1. macroduck

            So…you just say crazy stuff for effect in your regular line of work? But then, your regular line of work includes sucking up to Bannon in public, so yeah, crazy stuff.

          2. Moses Herzog

            If you claim to have an Asian American daughter-in-law (or sister-in-law, it doesn’t make a large difference) and pledge allegiance to Steve Bannon, you’ve left vanilla plain A-hole territory and now entered sociopath. Congrats.

          3. Steven Kopits

            While we did not have a chance to discuss it, I think my view on Russia differs materially from Bannon’s. I think he is much more isolationist. I am the most aggressive interventionist I know. I argued strongly here on Econbrowser than we should have interviewed directly in 2014 when Putin invaded Crimea. I am and have been making the same case now.

            However, I am not interested in either fighting or punishing Russia. This may be a necessity, but absolutely not a goal. I am interested in creating structures which allow Russia some breathing room while binding it to civilized norms in Europe. But to do that, you have to be willing to fight them on the field. That simple.

            Btw, expect the pressure on Taiwan to be ramped up hugely from early next week (as the Olympics end). Putin and Xi believe Biden is a fool and a coward, and all the evidence supports that view.

          4. Barkley Rosser

            Steven,

            Biden did botch the exit from Afghanistan, losing a lot of poll support. But he has managed to unify NATO for a solid front against any invasion of Ukraine, with even Germany signing on not only to financial punishment through ending SWIFT access, which will hurt Putin’s cronies, but also ending the Nordstream 2 deal, a big deal for Germany. That suggests that Biden has some clout and respect, a lot in fact, way more than Trump ever had with any of the US allies.

            I know you called for “fighting on the field” against Russia, and have a hard line side to you from your background in Hungary. But do note that there are no grounds for the US to do so in defense of a non-NATO member. It is pretty clear the US is willing to do so for NATO members, and sending troops to places like Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states reinforces that, and it looks that Putin is not about to mess with any of those seriously. Indeed, he understands the importance of NATO, which is why his big demand has been that Uktaine not join NATO.

            I think you are overdoing it with the fool and coward talk about Biden. He looks very much in charge and had put Putin on the spot, not able to get away with much. Disaster may still strike and the endgame here is very unclear, and I am a bit worried Biden may have overdone it with some of his forexasts of doom. But so far it looks like he has handled this extremely difficult situation pretty well.

          5. pgl

            Steven Kopits
            February 19, 2022 at 11:13 am

            This fool is now tracking polling numbers? I guess Princeton Stevie boy does not even get what a Russian invasion even means. BTW Stevie – stop quoting yourself as your words were beyond pathetic the first damn time around. Like I said earlier – you are an effing moron. STFU,

          6. Steven Kopits

            What does that mean, Barkley, ‘unify support’? Clearly, that ‘unified support’ did absolutely nothing to stir the Russians out of Crimea and Donbas. Rather, it has inspired Putin to try for all of Ukraine. Sanctions have backfired to date, and I see no reason — and no evidence — to suggest they will deter Russia in its current aggression. I think what you’re representing is wishful thinking, nothing more. Nothing shows that Putin has been deterred in the least.

            You say that I have a hard line due to my Hungarian background. Absolutely. We know the Russians. Don’t trifle with them. Tell them what you’re going to do, and do it. Don’t expect them to back down because you’re going to cancel their Netflix subscription. At the same time, Russia is not in the same class as the US. It has half the population and 1/14th the GDP. Russia’s economy is about the size of Spain’s. If Spain threated to invade Portugal, would the US run away like a helpless child? I think not. So why would it do so in Ukraine?

            Putin has been escalating both carefully and slowly. It is not lost on him that Russia is totally f**ked if the US enters militarily. He’s got lots of nice toys to deploy. We have nicer toys, and we can keep them in the field way, way longer than the Russians can. The Russians know that. I know that. Biden doesn’t.

            Now, the US does not have a treaty obligation to protect Ukraine, but it may certainly do so if President Biden so chooses.

            Oh, and by the way, Barkley, the US has no treaty with Taiwan, either.

            Guess what happens over there next week.

        1. Pgl

          Stevie proudly notes he will talk to anyone. Too bad he was not around in 1939 as he have been Hitler’s mouth piece

          1. pgl

            Steven Kopits
            February 19, 2022 at 11:15 am
            ‘with’, not ‘for’

            Actually I said “to” not “for”. But yea – you are only Donald Trump’s mouth piece, which is not much of an upgrade in mob bosses.

  2. Anonymous

    von clauzwitz said a ton of things in his short life.

    the art of war is: “strategy, tactics and logistics”

    us army doctrine has: “strategy, operations, and tactics”

    operations unites strategy and tactics and shucks in logistics.

    where are the fuel dumps and transport to move with the maneuver columns? the russians’ problems will be blood, bullets, beans” , always under worry about fuel!

    mud season is coming…..

    1. Menzie Chinn Post author

      Anonymous: If the reports of relatively small amounts of logistical support are correct, then brief lightning strike w/o expectation of long occupation of vast swathes of territory would seem to be the plan. Of course, that could be the plan, that might not survive the first engagement; there might be what some people called “dead-enders” in a previous anticipated quick success (I’ll let you google that) around, forcing a long and grueling counter-insurgency struggle.

      1. Anonymous

        Professor.

        here is a little ditty shared among logistics people in my time in service. an admiral started it around iirc.

        http://www.logisticsworld.com/logistics/quotations.htm#:~:text=Logisticians%20are%20a%20sad%20and,men%20who%20merchant%20in%20theories.&text=The%20people%20who%20merchant%20in,them%20in%20peace%2C%20are%20generals.

        i think of this often when i see things done by csis and such.

        I have seen analysis about guerilla ‘leave behinds’, the kind of ops usmc had in falluja are not cultural to european people. a lot of the ‘die hards’ are far right and not real popular with the locals.

        the point of logistics is the us/dod took 5 months and built an iron mountain of stores and several lakes of fuel to go in to kuwait. much less distance and better tank country than ukraine.

        the russian op will be short distance,

        or maybe putin has few logisticians and it will bog down and his frustration…..

    2. Moses Herzog

      How dare you bring an innocent German philosopher into this conversation of war.

      Some war humor. It worked for Bob Hope didn’t it?? I want that Bob Hope gravy-train, minus the Bob Saget skull fractures.

    3. Ulenspiegel

      “operations unites strategy and tactics and shucks in logistics.”

      That does not even make sense when we consider statements of US military historians – actually writing for the US army: The US commanders in WWII compensated for OPERATIONAL and tactical deficiencies with logistics. :-)))

      Logistics affect all levels of warfare and logistics in a broader sense is a strategic asset.

      1. Anonymous

        ulenspigel,

        you mis interpret i meant the ops’ plan linked the material allowance for/of the tactics with the strategy..

        my wording was imprecise

        and there were ops plans from theater to mission package …….

  3. macroduck

    The point of sanctions in case of war iis to make the economic consequences worse than Russia has anticipated. The point of sanctions threats is to convince Russia that war is not worth the consequences. The U.S. Senate, Germany and Austria have seriously undermined efforts to prevent war. It will be a disaster if war occurs, but the right response would still be to impose draconian economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus.

    End pipeline projects. Cut lending. Retaliate against cyber attacks by every method short of violence. Shore up westen banks so that a cut-off from SWIFT can follow. More stuff I haven’t thought of.

    So the analysis Menzie provided should be a baseline which western allies agree will be nothing compared to the economic harm Russia and Belarus suffer. Ukrainian lives and freedom should not be lost without a response that makes Russia, and China, shy away from future aggression.

      1. macroduck

        Stevie, you need to be more careful with pronouns. The antecedent to “that” is, what, imposing god-awful sanctions if Russia goes to war with Ukraine? Not sure how its too late to do something in the future.

        Please do enlighten us.

          1. Steven Kopits

            I think sanctions will prove insufficient. I take Zelenskyy’s point that sanctions may be more effective before the fact than after. Once the Russians have taken territory, sanctions will not make them give the territory back. I certainly support sanctions.

            But I don’t think they will alter the outcome either way. Only the threat of military intervention will.

          2. baffling

            steven, how do you justify those extreme sanctions prior to an invasion? economic warfare will be responded to, probably militarily. it simply does not seem reasonable, nor effective, to enact sanctions prior to the action for which you use to justify the sanctions. you are not dealing with reality. you have a solution to a problem that has not yet occurred. there is not much you can do preemptively, other than show your feathers and squawk loudly. and give the ukrainians the weapons needed. note this was a blunder of the trump administration, holding up weapons. makes you wonder just how much influence putin really did have over trump. seems he convinced trump to withhold weapons as political leverage, while putin benefited militarily. trump got taken. again.

  4. JohnH

    The view from outside the beltway:

    “ Every day brings new noise and fury in the crisis over Ukraine, mostly from Washington. But what is really likely to happen?

    There are three possible scenarios:

    The first is that Russia will suddenly launch an invasion of Ukraine.

    The second is that the Ukrainian government in Kyiv will launch an escalation of its civil war against the self-declared People’s Republics of Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR), provoking various possible reactions from other countries.

    The third is that neither of these will happen, and the crisis will pass without a major escalation of the war in the short term.

    So who will do what, and how will other countries respond in each case?

    Russian invasion

    This seems to be the least likely outcome.”
    https://original.antiwar.com/mbenjamin/2022/02/17/what-is-going-to-happen-in-ukraine/

    1. Menzie Chinn Post author

      JohnH: You seem to be under the mis-apprehension that I live within the Beltway (or that Wells Fargo is based in Washington, DC – I assure you it isn’t).

          1. Moses Herzog

            @ macroduck
            Wish I had thought of that last line. I mean, I like JohnH more than Kopits, but certainly it hits Kopits’ nail square on the head.

          2. Moses Herzog

            For those of you baffled why I rarely go after commenter JohnH, JohnH has just enough Howard Beale inside of him, I just can’t get the knife out on JohnH, I just can’t bring myself to do it. And maybe that speaks to some foible or inadequacy in my own character, but I just can’t generally do it.

  5. macroduck

    Major U.S. equity indices are down less than 2% this week. Ten year Treasury yield still around 1.9%, stalling the earlier rise.

    Rate hike expectations, however, have come down a bit this week. Maybe what stalled the rise in long rates. Still not a big flight to safety. As if market participants don’t think policy makers will allow a little war to deflect attention from making money.

  6. Ivan

    From what I have heard it looks mostly like Putin is intend on taking the rest of the Donbas region, probably just using forces that can be claimed to be Ukrainian “rebels”. Then they can declare themselves an independent country and Putin has his craved, but moronic, Vassal buffer state (of no use against modern warfare) in case Napoleon decide to invade again. With Putin locking up Ukraine forces all along its border, the “rebels” may have a chance of taking the rest of Donbas. Worst case scenario Putin will have plenty of soldiers that can throw on new cloth and pretend to be rebels.

    US has gotten involved exactly as it should by giving Ukraine all the weapons they asked for. With anti-aircraft, anti-tank and missile armed drones, the Ukraine forces are way too dangerous for a full scale all out war. Putin would be insane to do that, but maybe he is.

    1. baffling

      agree, I think Putin is after the donbas region, today. he got Crimea yesterday. tomorrow he will inch further along. he knows there is an all out war if he invades all of Ukraine. but he can probably inch his way through the country. if after retaking donbas, he moves the “rebel” boundary a little further toward Kiev, then you know that is his plan. he is banking on the hope that he can retake Donbas without economic sanctions being fully deployed. piece by piece.

  7. dilbert dogbert

    I have this faint memory that Stalin took part of Hungary west of the Carpathian’s post WW2. Would Hungary want to do a little adventuring of its own if the Russians keep the Ukrainians occupied to the east?

    1. Barkley Rosser

      DD,

      Not likely.

      You have brought up one of the most historically complicated zones in all of Europe, technically now known as Carpatho-Ukraine or awhiile ago, Transcarpathian Ukraine, and is more south of the Carpathians than west of them, the Carpathians running more east-west than north-south. It is currently indeed part of Ukraine, but was also indeed conquered by Stalin’s Soviet Union during WW II. Its largest city and local capital is Uzhgorod.

      Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire before WW I, when what is now L’viv in western Ukraine was Lemberg in the Austrian province of Galicia, this province was under the Hungarian part of that empire and known as Ruthenia. Its population was one of the most complicatedly mixed bags anywhere on the continent, with essentially different villages containing different people, with the identities of some of these groups matters of dispute, with this true even now, although many of those people have either been killed or have left since that time. Ethnic Hungarians were one of the least populous groups. There were Jews and Saxon Germans. There were also several Slavic groups including Ukrainians, Slovaks, but with the most numerous group being Ruthenians, also known as Rusyns, who also were split into Catholic and Orthodox groups. I happen to know that as of 30 years ago there were two separate neighborhoods in Chicago of people from each of these two groups, who called themselves Ruthenians.

      After WW I, Ruthenia became the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, with the Slovak part of that nation dominating it and claiming that the Ruthenians were really Slovaks, most of whom are Catholics. In 1939, an independent Ruthenia (or Subcarpatho Rus) was briefly declared. During the war it would fall back under control of Hungary, which had an alliance with Germany. By the end of the war Stalin’s Soviet army conquered it, and it was assigned to the Ukrainian SSR of the USSR. Its position in Ukraine today is complicated, with Ukraine largely claiming the Ruthenians are Ukrainians while allowing some local language autonomy.

      Exactly who this group really are remains an ongoing debate, with some people, including some of them, claiming that they are the original Russians, with those who think that preferring to call them “Rusyns” rather than “Ruthenians.” There are Rusyns or Ruthenians in Slovakia and Hungary as well as the Zarkopattia oblast of Ukraine. I note that under Stalin, there existence was not recognized and they were considered to be Ukrainians. It was only in 2012 that Ukraine accepted that they have their own language and began allowing some support for it in Zarkopattia.

      In any case, these days there are very few Hungarians there (and also very few Jews or Germans). While right wing nationalist Hungarians periodically call for reincorporating Wallachia, the western part of Romania with many ethnic Hungarians in it, and Vojvodina in northern Serbia, which also has lots of ethnic Hungarians, both of which were in Hungary during the Austro-Hungarian Empire and also were put under Hungarian control during WW II, there is little interest in Hungary now in reaquiring Carpatho-Ukraine.

      Of course, if the maximum possible scenario of the six in these maps Menzie shows here, which have been floating around for about a month now, comes to pass with a full conquest of Ukraine by Putin’s Russia, Putin will have to figure out how to deal with this odd zone with its peculiarly distinct people. I do not know what his view is of the theory that the Rusyn-Ruthenians are the original Russians is, although their current language is not all that close to modern Russian, indeed probably being closer to Slovak than to either Russian or Ukrainian.

      You did not know what you were getting into with that one, did you, DD?

      1. Steven Kopits

        I think Barkley is right on this one. Hungarians have no interest in that part of Ukraine, which if anything, is more relevant to the Slovaks. Transylvania, on the other hand, sure, we’ll take that. It’s that territory which helps us understand the Russians.

        1. Barkley Rosser

          Stevven,

          The Rusyn/Ruthenian minority is now recognized in northeestern Hungary where 72 villages have them having special privileges. Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, the Czech Republic, and Romania also recognize them as a minority group, along with now Ukraine itself, somewhat reuluctantly. Estimates of their total numbers in the world range from about a million to maybe as high as 1.7 million. Many have been assimilated into the nations they are located in.

          An old idea many hold to associated with the name “Rusyn” is that they are the last and purest remnant of the original Kyivan Rus from the time when the East Slavs were a united group, this vision being the basis of Putin’s distorted claim that the Uktainians are not really a separate people from the Russians, thus presumably justifying him to simply conquer the whole country. But the Great Russians and Ukrainians and Belarusians apparently had fully distinct languages by about 500 years ago, even if they did not have well defined national units of their own, and with the Ukrainians ruled by various other groups at different times, including with the western areas they lived never under tsarist Russian rule, only being ruled by Mosxow after WW II.

          As regards the problematic view of the Ukrainians towards the Rusyn, the view of their hardline nationalists is that the Rusyn indeed are just a subset of Ukrainians. There are 22 recognized dialects of the Ukrainian language, with those hardliners claiming the ancient Rusyn language is another of those dialecrts. But most view their language as fully distinct, as much so as Ukrainian is from Russian.

          BTW, the term “Ruthenian,” which is of Latin origins, is what they were called by the Austrians and Hungarians and Czechoslovaks before WW II, with it not being liked now by wither the Ukrainians or by the Rusyna in Carpatho-Ukraine. But it is still used by people of that ethnic group here in the Us, one of whom I know personally, a guy who grew up in the old Catholic Ruthenian naighborhood of Chicago.

          1. Steven Kopits

            I never heard of or met a Ruthenian in Hungary. There are a lot of gypsies in northeast Hungary, but other than Hungarians, that’s the only ethnic group I heard of near the Ukrainian border. As I understand it, the term Ruthenian is used to mean East Slavs, and Hungarians are not Slavs. In any event, that region is of no interest to the average (or even well off average) Hungarian today.

            At the same time, that area is really a fascinating mix of nationalities and religions historically, very unusual considering its geographically remote and fairly inaccessible location.

            As for Transylvania: Modern Romania is bisected by the Carpathian mountains, with Transylvania to the west. As a matter of geography, Transylvania orients towards Budapest and is geographically and culturally best understood, I think, as far limit of western Europe. The other side of the mountains is the rest of Romania, which is really part of the Balkans and the Asia minor complex. It orients towards the Black Sea and Istanbul, and the religion is Orthodox, as are say, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, among others.

            The Hungarian interest in Transylvania is not purely sentimental. It also makes sense from an ethnic, religious and geographic perspective.

          2. Barkley Rosser

            Steven,

            The Carpathians do a curve, being mostly east-west in the northwest, but then bend to go south into Romania. That the remnant Rusyns have hung out there is the remoteness where an ancient group and language could persist. It would seem there are only a few thousand of them in current Hungary, almost certainly more Roma now.

          3. Steven Kopits

            Yes, Barkley, there are apparently a few thousand Ruthenians. I have no idea what that means. On the other hand, you can walk down any thoroughfare in Budapest and hear six languages in any 100 meters. Lots and lots and lots of foreigners. Russians, Czechs, Germans, Americans, Brits, Spanish, Irish, Italians, Austrians, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Poles, French, nowadays fewer Asians with covid (but the signs at Budapest Airport are also in Chinese — no corruption involved!). It’s very international, and Hungarians are quite okay with that! It’s all about hospitality, something the Chinese might have recalled during the winter Olympics.

  8. Ulenspiegel

    “US has gotten involved exactly as it should by giving Ukraine all the weapons they asked for. With anti-aircraft, anti-tank and missile armed drones, the Ukraine forces are way too dangerous for a full scale all out war. Putin would be insane to do that, but maybe he is.”

    The weapons do not change the fact that the Russian forces will defeat the Ukrainian. The issue is occupation: For the complete occupation you need much more soldiers than the Russian army can spare, and keep in mind the western parts of the Ukraine are anti-Russian, you can expect insurgencies. The last scenario is pure fiction IMHO.

    Check the topic at the Dupuy Institute (“mystics and statistics”).

    1. Ivan

      There is no doubt that Russia has the conventional military power to take all of Ukraine, if he goes full in on that. The question would be at what cost. The current 200K force would be too small for a convincing victory. No matter what Putin did there would almost certainly be some embarrassing loses and delays. I doubt Putin would risk showing to the world how ineffective and weak his conventional military forces really are. You are right that since 2014 it would also be an occupation of a very hostile territory, and that would cost a lot more than Putin could afford in the long run.

      1. pgl

        Even if he took over Ukraine – Putin’s forces would have a hard time managing the new Ukraine going forward. I guess he did not pay attention to what happened when the US occupied Iraq and tried to set up our puppet regime. But one would think he would remember the disaster that occurred after the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan.

      2. baffling

        what is of concern, is if Putin really has a complete disregard for the people of Ukraine. he could exact a devastating blow to the civilian population of Kiev, killing thousands. it would serve as a lesson as he continued to take land from the eastern border. I don’t think the total occupation is on his mind, today. but it could be in a decade, once the nation has been torn to shreds.

  9. Ivan

    The amazing thing is that Putin is taking all these loses and risks over a piece of land that have no value. Modern warfare is not done in a way where buffers of land have much of any meaning. And that is presuming that the war stay with conventional weapons. A war between two nuclear armed countries has no more than 24 hours before it either is stopped or go all out nuclear. There is a huge advantage to doing the first strike of Nuclear weapons, because it is the only way to have a chance of avoiding a complete annihilation of your country. Putins strategic thinking seems to be as if he fears a war where Napoleon or Hitler would be invading Russia – the world has changed a lot since them. For a nuclear power the size of Russia it doesn’t matter if enemy troops are stationed at the border of 200, or 500 miles away from it. Yet Putin has already booked huge political and economic costs for the sake of some useless swampland.

    1. pgl

      I had thought the Crimea occupation was about oil. But Donbas? The only benefit to Putin that I can see is that he does not want a successful democracy at his door step.

      1. Barkley Rosser

        pgl,

        Crimea was about quite a few things, but oil was almost assuredly not one of them. No oil or pipelines there or anywhere nearby. The list of reasons why Putin wanted Crimea included 1) not having to get permission of Ukraine government for their major naval base at Sevastopol, 2) Crimea was part of Russian SSR until Khurshchev gave it to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 under complicated circumstances I have discussed here previously, 3) Population there definitely most pro-Russian of any part of Ukraine, with only 54% voting to be in Ukraine in 1991, compared with over 80% doing so in the current Luhansk and Donetsk republics, 4( Crimean pensioneers wanted to get higher Russian pensions (and did), 5) Great vacation place plus wine and other southern products production, although little of this latter has been delivered, 6) More broadly giving lots of border for Russia on crucial Black Sea, 6) Popular to get it in Russia.

        Anyway, lots of reasons for Putin to go for Crimea that had nothing to do with oil.

      2. Ulenspiegel

        “I had thought the Crimea occupation was about oil. ”

        No. during the Soviet Union the Krim belonged Russia until ~1955, but was attached to Ukraine due to economic reasons – water supply for agriculture was IIRC the main reason.

        The Krim has a useful habour, there were military reasons for the occupation in 2014.

    2. baffling

      “A war between two nuclear armed countries has no more than 24 hours before it either is stopped or go all out nuclear. ”
      Putin is not doing this as a way to address nuclear threats. I do not believe either Russia or the USA have any inkling this could go to a nuclear theater. it will stay conventional. this is about sphere of influence. Putin feels Ukraine has historically been under the Russian sphere of influence. they are now leaning west. that makes Russia less important. he will not let that happen without a fight of some sort. he was willing to fight for Crimea. he will do so for donbas as well. it sends a warning to the remaining satellites (think Belarus).

  10. Barkley Rosser

    Actually looking at these scenarios again I think the most likely is one that is not listed. I would call it 2b or maybe 2 Plus. It involves putting lots of troops and support into the Donbas republics, which have been the major focus of most of the false claims going on so far, and then having their enhanced troops expand their territories of control somewhat, such as taking the port of Mariupol that DRP controlled briefly previously and some other territory.

    But this would not involve some Scenario 3 or 4 running all the way to the Dniepr. That would involve a full rolling of those d.a. tanks Putin has and would trigger a sanctions response. We are talking more some relatively minor land grabs to extend the effective sizes of the republics. Then Putin could recognize them, with Zelendky not able to do much about it, but no deal done, with Putin saving his face.

    Anyway, I do not see something like this among the six scenarios here, although as of now it looks the most likely to me.

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