That’s my description. From their newly released NBER Working Paper, Bilateral Conflict Risk and Trade: Military Wars, Trade Wars, and Diplomatic Noise, by Joshua Aizenman, Rodolphe Desbordes and Jamel Saadaoui:
Lydia De Pillis has an article in the NYT on how gasoline prices don’t move one-for-one with oil prices:
Front month Brent futures (for June) jumped tonight. Where are gasoline prices going, conditional on those futures being predictive.
Consider this graph, comparing the Administration’s forecast to the latest WSJ forecast, and an error correction model incorporating Census population forecast.
The optimism of Friday has been wiped away. The odds of a re-opening by May 15 down to 37%, and June contracts up by 5.9%.
Today, we present a guest post written by Jeffrey Frankel, Harpel Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and formerly a member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. A shorter version was published in Project Syndicate. Thanks are due Sohaib Nasim for research assistance.
With the recent drop in odds for Strait of Hormuz re-opening, time to examine how credible Mr. Trump’s remarks are being taken. To me, with odds back to below pre-cease fire rates, it seems to me punters should be a little less credulous, In other words, given Mr. Trump’s penchant for overstatement, why do we see these gyrations?
Answer to Question 5 on Problem Set 4 in Public Affairs 854:
After all, what do those uppity meteorologists know that the DOGE guys didn’t.
From Ranking Member Meng Opening Statement at the National Weather Service Hearing (March 26, 2026):
Following up on comments to the post “Where did all the affordable cars go”, a typical new vehicle bought in 1960 was $1900; in October 2025, it was over $50000. What does that mean?