Since the incoming administration has indicated the deportations will start on day one, I thought it of use to consider the sectoral impacts of a policy of mass deportation (aside from macro based ones as discussed here).
Today, we are pleased to present a guest contribution written by Joshua Aizenman (University of Southern California) and Jamel Saadaoui (Université Paris 8-Vincennes). This post is based on the paper of the same title.
Including HICP and nowcasted PCE deflator.
Daniel Lacalle via Zerohedge writes Continue reading
Not that it ever disappeared completely. But expect the EPU to rise as the tariffs start flying, and the deportations begin.
Today we are pleased to present a guest contribution by Mark Copelovitch (Political Science and La Follette School, University of Wisconsin – Madison) and Michael Wagner (Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin – Madison).
NFP and private NFP up (although below recent peaks), while civilian employment rises.
Following up on the examination of what the term spread predicts, here’s the slope coefficients for the term spread, in regressions augmented with short rate, from 1946-2023Q3 (GDP growth 1947-2024Q3).
It’s commonplace to correlate term spreads with future economic activity measured one way or thSo, while other. Recessions in the US do seem to be predictable on the basis of term spreads; but recessions are a binary variable insofar as the NBER, ECRI, and other institutions define it. What about growth as a continuous variable — be it growth of GDP or industrial production?
Industrial and manufacturing production down at consensus rate (-0.3% m/m for both). Core retail sales +0.1% vs. consensus +0.3% m/m. First up, series followed by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee (personal income and employment are key):