Today, we’re pleased to present a guest contribution by Laurent Ferrara (Professor of Economics at Skema Business School, Paris and Chair of the French Business Cycle Dating Committee).
Here are some key indicators followed by NBER’s BCDC, including employment for November (227K vs. 202K consensus, 194K vs. 160K consensus, for NFP, and private NFP respectively).
(Or, ” I have in my hand fifty-seven cases of individuals…”) At 3:44 into this video, this Ms. DiMartino Booth makes this assertion, claiming this is the reason we haven’t seen a recession in the data pre-election.
As I have observed before, the explanation for why we have not yet seen a recession’s onset in the data yet could be one of the following: (1) the model based on historical correlations is no longer applicable (DGP has changed), (2) we were using the wrong model, (3) the recession is yet to come, but has not yet shown up in the data. In addition, it could be the model was right, and in a probabilistic world, there’s never a sure thing.
Trend shifted down, but sensitivity up.
Here are key indicators followed by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee (top indicators employment and person income) plus monthly GDP from S&P (nee Macroeconomic Advisers nee IHS Markit):
GDP, GDO, GDP+:
One of the last snapshots of the Biden economy show real consumption and personal income rising, with consumption rising 0.6% (vs. consensus of 0.3%), and faster than inflation. Here are some key indicators followed by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee.
Daniel Lacalle via Zerohedge writes Continue reading
It’s commonplace to correlate term spreads with future economic activity measured one way or thSo, while other. Recessions in the US do seem to be predictable on the basis of term spreads; but recessions are a binary variable insofar as the NBER, ECRI, and other institutions define it. What about growth as a continuous variable — be it growth of GDP or industrial production?