In response to my summary for 2022 and argument that it was unlikely that 2022H1 would be called a recession, Mr. Steven Kopits writes:
So, for H1:
3. Civilian employment was flat to down
Well, it pays to look at actual data before pontificating.
In response to my summary for 2022 and argument that it was unlikely that 2022H1 would be called a recession, Mr. Steven Kopits writes:
So, for H1:
3. Civilian employment was flat to down
Well, it pays to look at actual data before pontificating.
Last year’s recap was entitled “Year in Review, 2021: Cleaning Up What Trump Wrought”. This year, with rational policymaking returning, it’s time to erase stupidity.
Weekly indicators from Lewis-Mertens-Stock (NY Fed) Weekly Economic Indicators, and Baumeister, Leiva-Leon and Sims WECI and Woloszko (OECD) Weekly Tracker through 12/24, released today.
Initial claims hit expectations, while continuing claims surprise on upside (1710K vs 1686K consensus).
A new paper in the Review of International Economics, coauthored with Caroline Jardet and Cristina Jude (both Banque de France). From the conclusion:
From BOFIT, revisions back several years, showing a sharper drop in Q2 (5.2% q/q vs original 1.9%).
With provocative incursions of Chinese aircraft across the Taiwan Strait median line around Christmas Day (perhaps as a message responding to the US defense bill), it’s useful to review China’s military posture. Here’s the disposition of Chinese forces in the Eastern and Southern Theaters, as noted by the DoD’s 2022 assessment.
Advance indicators for the goods trade balance came in today, at -$83.35 bn above consensus of -$96.90 bn.
Over this period, growth has generally surprised on the downside.
In 2019, Fed economist David Miller undertook a comprehensive assessment of term spread predictive power for recessions (There is No Single Best Predictor of Recessions). For the 1984-2018 period, he found the following: