Torsten Sløk at Deutsche Bank had an interesting commentary [not online] this morning, noting the disjuncture between the different estimates of estimated term premia from affine (no arbitrage) models of the term structure emanating from the NY and SF Feds. I adjust the term spread by the term premium from SF and show the implied probability of recession, alongside that from the conventional 10yr-3mo.
Category Archives: recession
Why Drop Rates?
My answer on Marketplace yesterday was essentially “why not”. On macro grounds, with prospects for economic activity softening, a bit of insurance isn’t too crazy.
Of Sugar Highs, Uncertainty, and Recession
Growth is already slated to decelerate, but in the absence of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, it might have decelerated even more; on the other hand in the absence of crazy high policy uncertainty, growth might have been faster…
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Recession Watch, July 2019
With the release of nonfarm payroll employment (NFP) numbers today, we have a new set of readings on indicators emphasized by the NBER BCDC (used in dating the end of the 2001 recession), since my last post on recession indicators. While NFP continues to trend upwards, industrial production, personal income excluding current transfers, manufacturing and trade industry sales are all below recent peaks. Monthly GDP has risen to match the last peak in January 2019.
Nonfarm Payroll Employment Growth in Context
Blockbuster (absolute level) growth number for nonfarm payroll employment. But does the percentage growth rate in NFP dispell the prospect of recession in the near future? I don’t think so.
Guest Contribution: “Economic Policy Uncertainty and Recession Probability – July 2019 Update”
Today, we are fortunate to present a guest contribution written by Paweł Skrzypczyński, economist at the National Bank of Poland. The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the National Bank of Poland.
Plain-Vanilla Term Spread Model: Recession Probability for 2020M06=42%
(7/1 – with update including credit spread augmented specification.) Estimated probit over 1986M01-2018M06 period (assuming no recession as of 2019M06):
Prob(recessiont+12=1) = -0.323 – 0.869Spreadt
McFadden R2 0.295, observations = 390, bold denotes significance at 5% msl. Spread in percentage points.
Recession Indicators, June 21
Industrial production, personal income ex-transfers, and Macroeconomic Advisers’ monthly GDP are all below recent peak; manufacturing and trade industry sales and nonfarm payroll employment are still rising (although barely, in the latter case). Here’s a graph of these five indicators.
Guest Contribution: “Tenth birthday of the June 2009 recovery “
Today, we present a guest post written by Jeffrey Frankel, Harpel Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and formerly a member of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. A shorter version appeared in Project Syndicate on June 14th, and in The Guardian.
CEA Chief Economist Casey Mulligan on the Eve of the Great Recession
(Well, actually, the recession had been underway for nearly ten months, and after Lehman Brothers, on October 26th, 2008). Or why I worry about the White House economic policy management team.
NO DEPRESSION; NO SEVERE RECESSION
The medium term fundamentals point toward more real GDP, more employment, and (to a lesser degree) more consumption. Some employment and real GDP declines may occur in the short run, but they will be small by historical standards. Professor Cooley recently explained “The losses to date represent less than .5% of the work force. In the relatively mild recession of 2001 to 2002, job losses equaled about 1% of the work force. In the much more severe recession of 1981 to 1982, job losses totaled nearly 3% of the labor force–six times today’s figure. And in the (truly) Great Depression–invoked, now, with an alarmist frequency–job losses between 1929 and the trough in 1933 were 21% of the labor force.” Note that 21% over 3 1/2 years is an average decline of 2% every quarter for 14 consecutive quarters! If employment declines 2% in even one quarter, or 5% over a full year, I will admit well before 2010 that a severe recession is happening and that my 2010 forecasts are unlikely to be attained.
According to the BLS, national nonfarm employment was 136,783,000 (SA) at the end of 2006, as the housing price crash was getting underway. Real GDP was $11.4 trillion (chained 2000 $). Barring a nuclear war or other violent national disaster, employment will not drop below 134,000,000 and real GDP will not drop below $11 trillion. The many economists who predict a severe recession clearly disagree with me, because 134 million is only 2.4% below September’s employment and only 2.0% below employment during the housing crash. Time will tell.