Figure 1: Household equity wealth, in billions dollars (blue, left log scale), and estimated based on Russell 5000 (blue triangle at 2020Q1), and consumption, in billions Ch.2012$ SAAR (red, right log scale). Source: Fed Flow of Funds, via FRED, BEA 2019Q4 2nd release, and author’s calculations.
Note that scales are in logs. The picture looks a lot worse in levels.
On the other hand, equities net worth is only about 18% of total net worth in 2019Q4.
Goldman Sachs reported out their forecast. Don’t be deceived by the “snapback” in growth rates…the levels look grim.
Figure 1: GDP (black), CBO January 2020 forecast (gray), Goldman Sachs March 4 forecast (pink), Goldman Sachs March 15 forecast, all in bn.Ch.2012$, SAAR. Source: BEA 2019Q4 2nd release, CBO Budget and Economic Outlook (January 2020), Goldman Sachs, and author’s calculations.
[Update – Figure added 3/14 1:30pm Central. Source: Torsten Slok, DB.]
From The Hill today:
One model from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggested that between 160 million and 210 million Americans could contract the disease over as long as a year. Based on mortality data and current hospital capacity, the number of deaths under the CDC’s scenarios ranged from 200,000 to as many as 1.7 million.
It found as many as 21 million people might need hospitalization, a daunting figure in a nation with just about 925,000 hospital beds.
A tweet:
I am fine with govt. helping people pay bills. But the idea that the spending will actually increase GDP is the Keynesian argument that I find very misguided.
So, here it is useful to have a model discipline one’s arguments (textbook I’m using this semester, here, includes Classical as well as New Keynesian models). Fiscal stimulus, particularly some that have proposed, involves transfers (SNAP, unemployment insurance payments). Helping people pay bills presumably makes aggregate demand higher (by virtue of enabling greater consumption) than it otherwise would be. If there is slack in the economy (which is likely if lots of people can’t pay their bills), then higher aggregate demand will lead to higher output.
If higher demand results in higher production, that means that income necessarily is higher than it otherwise would be, and likely disposable income. That would then mean consumption should be higher; but that would mean higher aggregate demand, and hence higher output, and higher income, leading to a repeat cycle – albeit at a lower rate.
In other words, we have the Keynesian multiplier process. In the presence of slack in the economy, output will rise. Of course, assume that output falls entirely because of reduced production capacity (not a single person reduces consumption because they aren’t being paid), then increased transfers won’t do anything.
How likely is that condition?
The capacity for some people to engage in internally inconsistent reasoning and writing is breathtaking.
More on multiplier estimates here.
From Mr. Brian Riedl, in NRO:
The multiplier is small because, in the modern economy, idle savings are not common — even during a recession.
Feels like 2008-09. But doesn’t. Compare who’s running the show in the White House…(Updated lists from 2019 post).
[table corrected 3/10, thx to Giles Warrack]
The Fed looks good (when it’s allowed to do it’s own thing, unencumbered by Trump tirades). Otherwise…
It ain’t 2009…
Conditional on: “Once the confidence and the health of the American people is restored…”, as quote in The Hill today.
No major economics agency or group has forecasted a recession in their baseline. However, forecasts are definitely being marked down.
From Mr. Riedl at Manhattan Institute:
I really hope the fiscal stimulus debate doesn’t gain momentum. Not only is it premature…..but I don’t have the writing bandwidth to remind everyone how Keynesian stimulus is an outdated theory (the multiplier is close to zero) with a terrible historical track record.
Nonresidential fixed investment has been declining for three quarters, while equipment has been declining for two quarters. If Atlanta Fed nowcasts prove right for the current quarter, then as of 2020Q1, equipment investment will have fallen for three quarters (while nonresidential will still be below peak).